Dalheimer, A., & Wagner, M.: 'They Just Don't Get Us': Perceived (Mis)Understanding as a Driver of Affective Polarization and Avoidance Behavior
Prior research has identified partisan meta-perceptions as a potential source of partisan animosity. Building on this work, we introduce a concept that extends beyond perceived like and dislike: perceived understanding. Perceived understanding refers to the perception of how well out-partisans understand in-party voters' values, motives and intentions, and way of life. We expect the more people perceive their co-partisans to be misunderstood by out-party supporters, the more they will be affectively polarized, hostile, and avoidant toward out-partisans.
This paper uses three sources of data. First, original cross-sectional survey data from 13 countries is used to examine the prevalence of the perception that in-party supporters are misunderstood and how this correlates with key outcomes. Second, an experimental cognitive interview study in the US shows respondents' top-of-the-head considerations when answering our key survey questions. This will provide further evidence that the concept of perceived understanding differs from meta-perceptions. Third, a conjoint experiment assesses the causal effect of perceived (mis)understanding on affective evaluations and action tendencies. Through simultaneous manipulation of the perception of being misunderstood and meta-perceptions, the experiment aims not only to establish causality but also to demonstrate the distinct nature of these two concepts. The cross-sectional results indicate strong associations between perceived (mis)understanding, affective polarization, and avoidance tendency.
This project contributes to the ongoing research on partisan conflict by shedding light on the role of perceived (mis)understanding in shaping inter-group dynamics. The findings can inform targeted countermeasures to mitigate affective polarization and prevent further escalation of partisan animosity.
Cakir, S.: What Drives Affective Polarization? Real-World Evidence of Ideological and Identitarian Roots of Affective Polarization
Does elite ideological polarization increase mass affective polarization? I study this question with a real-world sudden increase in elite polarization in the United Kingdom resulting from (1) the Labour Party's sudden leftward shift in 2015 under a new leader, and (2) the Conservative Party's sudden change in Brexit policy following the 2016 referendum. Using panel data, I find that ideological elite polarization heightens affective polarization among citizens, particularly among non-partisans, providing evidence that affective polarization is also rooted in ideology. Importantly, among partisans, in-party enthusiasm drives the changes in affective polarization more than out-party hostility. Lastly, I show that the causal direction between how citizens perceive elite ideological polarization and how affectively polarized they are is bidirectional, suggesting that while some levels of affective polarization are inherent in democracies, affective polarization can, to a certain extent, be tamed by moderate position-taking by parties. These results carry important implications for the study of affective polarization across democracies.
Cakir, S., Wagner, M.: Explaining Partisan Prejudice: Social Status and Out-Partisan Hostility
Cakir, S., Wagner, M.: Multidimensional Politics and Out-Partisan Hostility
Hostility towards supporters of opposing political parties has been a subject of considerable scholarly attention. Existing research suggests that elite ideological polarization is key determinant of out-partisan dislike. However, the impact of party behavior in a multidimensional political space is not yet fully understood. While studies suggest that party polarization on social and economic dimensions might differently influence feelings towards out-partisans, it remains unclear under which conditions party extremity on one dimension exerts a more pronounced influence than the other, or if party extremity on different dimensions reinforces or mitigates each other's impact. This paper presents a theoretical framework that bridges both party- and citizen-level factors to explain how party position extremity affects dislike towards out-partisans in a multidimensional political space. Using novel survey data from 12 countries combined with the Global Party Survey, we find that party extremity on both social and economic dimensions leads to stronger dislike toward out-party supporters. At the party level, we show that the salience of a dimension to the party and the level of party unity on that dimension influence this relationship. At the citizen level, we test whether the salience of a dimension to the citizen and the citizen's ideological position relative to the party moderate the effect of party extremity but find no support for these arguments. Overall, our findings we suggest that party behavior is a key driver of dislike towards supporters of opposing parties.
Cakir, S., Wagner, M., Dalheimer, A., Harteveld, E.: Sources of Ideological Images of Opposing Party Supporters across 12 Countries
In a polarized political landscape, how do individuals form images of what opposing party supporters are like, and how accurate are these perceptions? In this study, we investigate the factors influencing individuals' perceptions of the ideological extremity and homogeneity of their political outgroup. This is important because ideological (mis)perceptions of opposing party supporters can serve as a strong catalyst for hostility towards these groups. We explore two sources citizens might use to arrive perceptions of out partisans. As a 'vertical' source, individuals are hypothesized to use party elites' extremity and homogeneity as cues and project these onto the parties' supporters. As a 'horizontal' source, individuals are expected to also consider the actual ideological extremity and homogeneity of opposing party supporters, which they might be aware of indirectly (through media or other mechanisms) or directly (through their own network). In addition, we expect that the diversity of political options available in a person's personal social network will moderate which cues they will rely on. We test our expectations about the sources of these perceptions, as well as how they steer citizens towards an (in)accurate understanding, using survey data from 12 democracies. We use novel items about the perceived ideological homogeneity and extremity of political outgroups, as well as information on respondents' own social network. By analyzing the interplay between vertical and horizontal cues in shaping (mis)perceptions, this research contributes to understanding of how political groups form mental images of each other, which in turn sheds light on the foundations of hostility between political camps.
Heinz, E., Pliskin, R., & Wagner, M.: The Power of Perceived Threat: Examining the Differential Effects of Realistic and Symbolic Threat on Partisan Prejudice
Affective polarization and partisan prejudice present critical issues within the U.S. and Europe, but these phenomena have been far less researched in European multiparty systems. This paper aims to address this gap by examining the origins of partisan prejudice in Europe through the lens of intergroup threat. Intergroup threat theory distinguishes between two types of threat: realistic (pertaining to the group's power, resources, and safety) and symbolic (pertaining to the values, beliefs, and meaning system of the ingroup). We investigate the differential effects of realistic and symbolic threats on partisan prejudice using a cross-sectional survey that includes 12 countries, followed by an online experiment where threat is manipulated. Our findings show that both types of threat influence prejudice towards out-partisans, with symbolic threat having a much larger effect than realistic threat. This underscores the importance of considering perceived threat when researching partisan prejudiceand developing interventions that specifically target symbolic threat perceptions.
Heinz, E.: Anger in the Face of Intergroup Threat: A Catalyst for Partisan Prejudice?
Although the term “affective polarization” implies the presence of affect or emotions, most of the research on polarization relies on feeling thermometers, while distinct emotions remain underexplored. Some studies have documented anger as a driver of polarization, showing that anger accelerates decision-making and reinforces existing beliefs. So, does anger also foster prejudicial attitudes towards out-party voters? We aim to answer this by examining the extent to which threat perceptions elicit emotions towards the in- and out-party and how this in turn influences prejudice towards out-partisans. As threats are generally associated with fear, we expect realistic threats (pertaining to status, resources and safety) to be linked with increased fear, while symbolic threats (pertaining to values, culture and worldview) are expected to increase anger. This paper uses a cross-sectional survey including 12 countries and an online experiment to investigate the mediating effect of anger on the relationship between perceived intergroup threat and partisan prejudice. The research highlights the significant role of threat and emotions in deepening polarized rifts and driving voters of opposing parties even further apart.
Rebasso, I., Cakir, S., & Wagner, M. From Leader Profiles to Voter Perceptions: Sociodemographic and Policy Cues
Citizens hold stereotypes about supporters of political parties, i.e., about their social background, motivations, and ideology. These partisan stereotypes are important as they can shape electoral support and affective evaluations towards other partisan groups. However, so far we know little about how partisan stereotypes emerge and change. In this paper, we examine the effect of party leaders. We suggest that their impact on stereotypes is twofold. First, citizens project the socio-demographic characteristics of leaders onto likely supporters. For instance, when parties have female leaders, voters believe that party supporters are also more likely to be women. Second, citizens use ideological positions to infer socio-demographic characteristics based on stereotypes of who supports which position. We test our expectations using two pre-registered studies: a visual vignette study, conducted in Germany, manipulating the socio-demographic and ideological characteristics of leaders; and a repeated cross-sectional survey in Austria, conducted before and after an unpredictable leadership change.
Rebasso, I., & Wagner, M.: Visual partisan Inference. Uncovering the mechanisms of (visual) political stereotyping
This project investigates the role of partisan stereotypes—assumptions about political leanings based on socio-demographic cues—in everyday social judgments. It has three main objectives: First, it aims to identify which partisan stereotypes exist and how people use social information to infer others' political orientation. Second, it examines whether these stereotypes influence trust in others, both in explicitly political and non-political contexts. Finally, the study explores who is most likely to use partisan stereotypes in their social judgments.
Rebasso, I., Wagner, M., & Dalheimer, A.: Measuring and predicting the moralisation of political identities in open-ended responses across 7 countries
Recent work shows that the way partisans view each other affects their feelings towards each other. In particular, the types of stereotypes people hold of outpartisans, whether they describe them in terms of groups or individual-level traits affects partisan animosity. In this paper we propose a competing view and argue that a key component of partisan dislike is often overlooked in the study of affective polarization: the moralisation of political identities. We study both inparty positive moralisation and the negative moralisation of other partisan groups using open ended stereotype questions across at least 7 countries. The key aim of this study is to test how the moralisation of political identities shapes and exacerbates partisan conflict.
Rebasso, I., & Wagner, M.: Partisan Network Heterogeneity in Multiparty Systems: Measurement, Predictors and Consequences
This paper explores the role of political networks in studying affective polarization in multi-party systems, focusing on how personal relationships reflect political diversity. While affective polarization—the growing animosity between opposing partisans—has traditionally been studied through social distance measures, these self-reports often confound different preferences and fail to capture the actual composition of political networks. In response, this paper proposes an adapted name-generator task to measure political network heterogeneity more accurately. By expanding the number of contacts respondents report and allowing for party or ideological block identification, the new method better captures personal networks in multi-party contexts. The paper also tests whether social networks can serve as indicators of both country-level polarization and individual proximity to political parties.
Rebasso, I., & Wagner, M.: Perceptions of partisan differential treatment in a paired comparison task
Research on affective polarization suggests that differential treatment based on partisanship or political views is widespread. Such differential treatment is sometimes referred to as partisan discrimination. In this paper, we aim to answer two main empirical questions. First, we want to find out if people see partisan and political differential treatment as wrong, and how the evaluations of such differential treatment compare to that based on other individual characteristics such as race, sexuality, gender, or class. We will also examine what types of differential treatment are seen as more problematic.Second, we test how frequent people think partisan differential treatment is. This is used a proxy, together with the perceived severity, for how widespread and concerning a social problem partisan differential treatment is seen as being.Finally, we will also examine how assessments of badness and frequency are associated with key country- and individual-level factors, specifically levels of affective polarization, political involvement, partisanship, ideological extremity, motivation to control prejudice and personal experiences with discrimination. In providing answers to these questions, this research aims to establish whether voters are concerned about the societal consequences of affective polarization. Moreover, we aim to show who is most and least concerned about these consequences, and provide a first answer as to why people differ in these assessments.
